Indian counter-insurgency in J&K has rested on the shoulders of
the Army and repeated success of the latter to bring it under control. The
political vacuum has remained consistent. This is due to presence of a large
neighbor determined to internationalize J&K. The foreseeable solution to
this bleeding problem is a comprehensive framework where India and Pakistan can
continue to compete regionally without having to antagonize each other on the
LoC and elsewhere. This requires increased efforts by India and Pakistan to research
and negotiate ideas such as the four-point framework which can move the ball
forward. Pakistan Army’s rollback of anti-India terrorism is fundamental to
this step. Terrorism is not an effective tool of conflict in the 21st
century. All forms of armed radicalism have backfired on the host states.
Pakistan Army needs to find alternative modes of competition to balance India.
The CPEC is one such mode and method for Pakistan. India on its part needs to
sustain the 7% inclusive growth and diverse character of its nationhood. This
requires a warlike effort focused on the training system of all institutions.
Funds need to be made available for better training in each and every
institution of the country- Universities, Military, Election Commission, Law
Enforcement and most importantly the schools. A balanced curriculum with
exercise of reason and critical thinking as its two pillars is the need of the
hour. All institutions have enough experience and quality currently but the
problem of India is not the existing quality but more quantity and improving
the existing quality.
The perennial problem of the bad quality of politics can only be
overcome if institutions are further populated with the best and the brightest.
This will be a slow but crucial process. India has always relied on the power
of good example instead of just a carrot-stick approach when it comes to
individuals. Such individuals manning institutions can in turn understand the
nuances of rationality when it comes to dealing with a complex problem such as
Pakistan. A reliance on strategic reviews, discussion and debate is fundamental
to maintain the flexibility to counter Pakistan’s current strategy. This
flexibility has to function under some limiting conditions- a rational vision
or goal, openness to ideas, a reliance on practical experience and evidence of
institutions and the checks and balances of the four pillars.
Indian Military is an old and seasoned institution with a rich
institutional history. The counter insurgency campaign in J&K has gone
through multiple iterations of updating, maintenance and correction. The Indian
Army has to be receptive to its chosen center of gravity. This COG is the
people of Kashmir in J&K. The Army has a proven track record in maintaining
the territorial integrity of the country. The political class is still to find
a strategy to effectively consolidate the unity. The political strategy needs
to be premised on an end state with openness to periodic review. The end state
for next 10 years should be conduct multi-level elections in J&K with a
good turnout. This can only be achieved by talking to Pakistan Army about new
rules of engagement. These rules include a cessation of terrorism, restarting
the comprehensive dialogue process with apex political backing and building
conventional deterrence. The modernization process of the Indian military is
urgent and needs to follow a doctrine. The Army’s role in internal security has
to be gradually and systematically reduced. The Pakistan Army will need
substantial inducements from the Indian political class to not interfere in
this process. The Pakistan army modernization should be acceptable to the
Indian strategists as long as it reinforces mutual conventional deterrence. Cross-Border Terrorism supported by Pakistan however, is more of a threat to Pakistan itself. A Pakistan threatened by
terrorism is not in the interest of India. Pakistan herself needs more time to
grow out of the dire politico-economic state.
The new rules of engagement between both countries will need to
assure or indicate the preservation of its status to the Pakistan Army.
Ultimately, the root cause of International problems in South Asia is Pakistan Army’s
insecurity about its place in Pakistan society. Pakistan Army is not devoid of
professionalism and liberalism within its ranks. It needs time to revive these
features to force a move away from a deep state strategy like encouraging
terrorism in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan has a rich history of modern
thought but this thought has been subverted in competing with the bigger India
in South Asia. India on the other hand, has looked to balance Pakistan in times
of crisis and the latter’s about-turns on agreements. The problem of J&K
would have essentially remained a negotiable India-Pakistan problem if the
factor of terrorism was not introduced by the Pakistan Deep state. Pakistan’s
own war on terrorism suggests that it is not beyond the capability of the
Pakistan Military to mitigate this threat. Why therefore does Pakistan persist
with such a strategy?
This takes us back to the problem of rationality being defined only
as self interest which is itself a legacy of earlier studies on economics.
Rationality should merely be defined as an exercise of reason. Whose interest, what and when can all be
discussed between two parties. And if both parties don’t agree, at least the
terms of competition can also be agreed on by the both parties. This requires a
comprehensive rationality approach by both countries where competition is not
allowed to turn into antagonism. Antagonism leads to tribal form of competition
which has nothing to do with any value or interest human beings claim to fight
for. So a framework of tacit competition has to precede a framework of peace in
such an intense rivalry such as India-Pakistan. This framework needs to acquire
resilience over time so that surprise events and serious sabotages do not take
both countries back to antagonism. I do not include terror attacks in such
events. Terror attacks have the character of derailing both peace and
Pakistan’s own national security objectives in the long run. This framework at
its core has to be a political framework ‘like’ the four-point framework.
This framework of competition will include mutual respect for
sovereignty, comprehensive peace process, LoC and IB management agreement and
most importantly people to people contact. Both countries are equally
responsible for such a framework. This framework has to be enforced by mutual
conventional deterrence and not rely overly on nuclear deterrence. Nuclear
Weapons should be used to further concretize conventional deterrence by
maintaining minimum level of modern strategic platforms and eliminating
tactical weapons. What constitutes as strategic in such close proximity should
be discussed between the two countries. Funds for modernization and increasing
the quality and quantity of leadership in both militaries will only be possible
if the political class is electorally coerced to release funds for education
and training. This electoral pressure can only be built by highlighting the
flab, obsolescence in both armies and need for modernization in ideational and
material sense. The Indian system provides more avenues for this compared to
the Pakistani system. But the power of example and the spirit of competition
can induce Pakistani Army to follow suit if the process is carried out in India
effectively and efficiently.
The problem of democracy in Pakistan is beyond the scope of Indian
influence but India can demonstrate greater diversity, debate and discussion.
India also suffers from many regressions and flaws but the Indian constitution
is a reliable and dynamic leviathan. Pakistani competitiveness needs to
manifest itself in making Pakistan a more livable and progressive place
relative to India. This can still happen without the status of Pakistan Army
being eroded if Pakistan Army leadership drives the process with caution and
prudence. Pakistan is also a diverse land with rich ideas but has been
constricted within an ideological identity. The CPEC can be a politico-economic
opportunity or a missed opportunity depending on Pakistan utilizes the
investment away from military goals. Pakistan Army’s commitment to inclusive
growth will be perennially tested in the current political system of military
primacy. The dividends of the China relationship are also dependent on the
recklessness or the prudence of the Pakistan Army. And these factors are beyond
the scope of Indian influence. An economically stronger Pakistan only provides
more opportunities to both India and Pakistan to exploit the proximate trade
relations.
These issues bring us back to the problem of J&K. The
pre-partition community in both countries underwent significant hardships by
the hands of the British rule followed by the trauma of Partition at the hands
of each other. J&K was a princely
state then. The next 70 years saw conflict between India & Pakistan. It saw
the advent of insurgency in J&K supported by Pakistan. Wars, Peace process,
Instrumentalisation of history, historic revisionism, Terrorism, Military
actions, Elections, Armed rebellion have all failed to assuage mutual fears and
disagreement over faith yet it’s easy to make this statement in hindsight. The
partition made this process of last 70 years partially inescapable for the chief
protagonists. Pakistan’s strategy embarked on revisionism through all means
possible. India’s strategy relied on denial through all means possible only
once opting for the punishment option in 1971. Questions of faith, trust and
geography have kept the two countries in a deadlock. The next logical step for
both countries therefore is to mold this deadlock in a comprehensive rational
framework instead of tribal antagonism followed in due time by a framework for
peace.
This blogpost has not dealt with countless victims of the relationship
in 70 years. The rivalry has taken a toll on both countries in multi-causal and
multi-symptomatic ways. Each case of injustice is one too many and requires due
process at least and correction at most. Each case requires dedicated research
and attention which is beyond the scope of the author and this blogpost. The
definition of justice itself is contested among both countries. The
disagreement, condition and complexity do not however preclude the continuing
effort to engage with each and every case under the microscope of public
scrutiny.
Permanent conflict and Permanent peace are ideal types which rarely
exist in reality. The former though has existed to a large extent in the
India-Pakistan relationship. The questions of who initiates and who follows up
can be settled with intensive backchannel preparation. A dialogue should
succeed a period of no cross border terrorism for optimal outcomes. Rules of
competition building up to rules of peace are practically worthy goals.
Realism, Idealism, Justice, History have all been given a chance with mixed
results. It’s about time both countries gave ‘REASON’ a serious chance
and effort.
Comments